Home » An investigation on off-hour delivery policy design using optimal incentives and a behavioral micro-simulation approach. by Michael Anthony. Silas
An investigation on off-hour delivery policy design using optimal incentives and a behavioral micro-simulation approach. Michael Anthony. Silas

An investigation on off-hour delivery policy design using optimal incentives and a behavioral micro-simulation approach.

Michael Anthony. Silas

Published
ISBN : 9781109515435
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92 pages
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 About the Book 

The objectives of this dissertation are to provide insight in designing off-hour delivery programs by developing: (1) policies to optimally distribute financial incentives to receivers gained from various funding mechanisms- (2) methods to simulateMoreThe objectives of this dissertation are to provide insight in designing off-hour delivery programs by developing: (1) policies to optimally distribute financial incentives to receivers gained from various funding mechanisms- (2) methods to simulate the behaviors of receivers and carriers pertaining to off-hour deliveries- (3) an understanding of how different market segments influence OHD operations- and (4) an understanding of how policy design will increase participation in off-hour deliveries. These objectives were achieved through policy mathematical models and a Behavioral Micro-Simulation framework developed here.-The mathematical policy models developed in this dissertation serve as guidelines to optimally distribute financial incentives, and to finance them through cases considering an exogenous budget and regular-hour penalties. In general, the optimal incentives found depend on: (1) the class elasticity to off-hour deliveries- (2) the average number of class tours per receiver- (3) the tour elasticity- (4) the cost to move tours to the off-hours- (5) the revenues collected from penalties- and (6) the inverse off-hour delivery market share. Using these optimal solutions, numerical experiments were conducted to prove that: (1) tours can be shifted to the off-hours when receivers are given incentives to accept off-hour deliveries- and (2) the penalties considered were all effective at generating a budget for OHD incentives.-The analyses done using the Behavioral Micro-Simulation revealed several key results: (a) financial incentives given to receivers in exchange for accepting off-hour deliveries, and financial rewards to carriers making off-hour deliveries would increase participation in off-hour deliveries- (b) time of day toll surcharges have no major impact on increasing off-hour deliveries- (c) carriers located close to their urban customers are more likely to participate in off-hour deliveries as they can easily begin to accrue the benefits from off-hour delivery operations- and, (d) increased enforcement of parking fines for double parking during the regular hours could increase the number of carriers participating in off-hour deliveries.